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ABSTRACT
Past work suggests that partisan attachments isolate citizens
from encountering elite  messages contrary  to their  points  of
view. Here, we present evidence that partisan attachments not
only serve to filter the information citizens receive from political
elites; they also work in the other direction, isolating politicians
from  encountering  potentially  contrary  perspectives  from
citizens. In particular,  we hypothesized that Americans prefer
expressing their  opinions to politicians who share their  party
identification  and  avoid  contacting  outpartisan  politicians.
Three  studies—drawing  on  a  mixture  of  observational,  field
experimental,  and  natural  experimental  approaches—support
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this  hypothesis:  citizens  prefer  to  “preach  to  the  choir,”
contacting legislators  of  the same partisan stripe.  In  light  of
evidence  that  contact  from  citizens  powerfully  affects
politicians’  stances  and  priorities,  these  findings  suggest  a
feedback loop that might aggravate political  polarization and
help explain how  politicians of different parties could develop
different perceptions of the same constituencies.
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“The constituency that a representative reacts to is the constituency that he
or she sees.” 
- Richard F. Fenno (1977, p. 883)
Foundational studies of political representation draw a careful 
distinction between legislators’ constituencies as they exist and as 
legislators see them. Miller and Stokes’ analysis of district opinion, for 
instance, notes a disconnect between the policies constituents say they favor
and representatives’ perception of the same (Miller and Stokes 1963). 
Fenno’s study of members in their home districts found that representatives 
perceive a set of sub-constituencies, each important to the representative in 
different ways (Fenno 1978). As these studies emphasize, because politicians
are guided by their perceptions of their constituencies, examining how 
legislators form such perceptions is central to understanding representation 
in general.
At least part of legislators’ perception of their constituencies appears 
to arise from individual constituents reaching out and expressing their 
opinions to legislators directly. Legislators often lack detailed knowledge 
about their constituents’ preferences (Broockman and Skovron 2014; Butler 
and Nickerson 2011; Miller and Stokes 1963). As such, legislators regularly 
turn to communication they receive to learn where constituents stand 
(Congressional Management Foundation 2011; Fowler and Shaiko 1987; 
Goldstein 1999; Kingdon 1989; Kollman 1998; Lee 2002) and what 
constituents find important (Miler 2010). Consistent with this notion, studies 
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that randomize constituent contact find that even a small amount of it can 
affect how legislators vote (Bergan 2009; Bergan and Cole 2014).
Although contact from citizens appears to powerfully influence 
legislators’ decisions, the volume of research on why citizens contact their 
legislators pales in comparison to other forms of political participation, such 
as the decisions to vote or donate money (e.g., Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Gerber and Green 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wright 1996). What 
research there is on contacting representatives tends to focus on 
characteristics of the citizens making contact and their life circumstances:1 
for example, there is evidence that traits that have a general bearing on 
political participation, like wealth and political interest, also influence how 
likely citizens are to contact legislators (Thomas and Streib 2003; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Likewise, other research finds that contact is a 
function of citizens’ awareness of a social problem and interest in having it 
addressed (Jones et al. 1977; related, see Thomas 1982). 
Here, we examine how one characteristic of politicians may influence 
citizens’ choices about whether to contact them: shared party affiliation. We 
hypothesized that citizens prefer to communicate to copartisan 
representatives based on a rich tradition in the psychology of intergroup 
relations suggesting that people prefer to interact with ingroup members and
avoid interactions with outgroup members (e.g., Allport 1954). In light of 
evidence that party affiliation constitutes a social identity for many 
1 An exception to this trend is studies that examine the racial match or mismatch between 
representative and constituents (Gay 2002; Broockman 2014).
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Americans (e.g., Green et al. 2002; Greene 1999; Iyengar et al. 2012; 
Iyenger and Westwood 2014; Mason 2014), we hypothesized that partisans 
exhibit these tendencies when considering whether to communicate to 
elites.2 We find support for this view across several studies. Rather than 
readily contacting outpartisan politicians with whom they may be more 
predisposed to disagree, many citizens appear to eschew contacting 
outpartisan elected officials and prefer contacting copartisans.
That citizens “preach to the choir” by preferentially contacting 
copartisans has important implications for the mindsets of elites. As we note 
above, politicians appear to turn to citizen contact in choosing their issue 
positions and deciding how to allocate their time. Our findings suggest that 
politicians turning to such contact will hear disproportionately from citizens 
in their own party, who will tend to reflect an unrepresentative set of 
attitudes and priorities. Along with work showing that the citizens most likely
to contact their representatives tend to have the most ideologically orthodox
views (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), our results highlight how a 
persistent bias in how citizens express their views could reinforce elite 
polarization. The findings also add to a growing literature suggesting that 
partisanship exhibits traits similar to other social identities (e.g., Iyenger and 
Westwood 2014; Gift and Gift 2014).
As we explain in more detail below, identifying the effect of shared 
partisanship on citizens’ contact decisions presents some challenges, with 
2 As we discuss in the following sections, there are alternative reasons to expect this effect 
as well.
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concerns about endogeneity, external validity, and social desirability arising 
in many readily-available data sources. As such, we report research that 
investigates the effect of partisanship in several complementary ways. First, 
we focus on the subset of states with U.S. senators of two different parties 
and find that citizens in these states prefer contacting a copartisan senator 
to contacting an outpartisan senator. This difference persists across two 
samples, and irrespective of whether or not the contact is to be for 
ideological reasons (Study 1). Second, two field experiments conducted by 
an interest group show that this explicit preference manifests in real-world 
behavior. Citizens of these states are also more likely to sign a petition 
addressed to a copartisan and seek to call a copartisan’s office when 
prompted (Study 2). Finally, employing a regression discontinuity analysis, 
we find that residents of congressional districts where an outpartisan 
narrowly won the last House election are less likely to report having 
communicated to their congressperson than residents of districts where the 
outpartisan congressperson narrowly lost (Study 3).
We begin with a brief review that grounds our guiding hypothesis in 
literatures in psychology, partisanship, and rational choice. Next, we present 
results from three studies and associated robustness checks, with special 
attention to the weaknesses inherent in each methodological approach that 
our other studies can help address. We close by considering the implications 
of this accumulated evidence for elite and mass political behavior.
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Citizen Preference for Copartisan Contact
Citizens reach out to their representatives for a variety of reasons, 
such as to express their views on issues and pending legislation, to raise new
concerns, to praise or criticize a representative’s actions, and to solicit help 
with bureaucracies. This ability for people directly to engage the individuals 
who represent them—to express their views in a way not constrained by the 
small number of competing electoral choices—is a hallmark of democratic 
governance (Verba and Nie 1972) and is explicitly enshrined in the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution.
Like so many other decisions, however, the choice of whether or not to 
participate in politics via direct contact occurs amidst the exigencies of 
everyday life. At the margin, citizens decide to undertake effortful contact 
with attention to the benefits and costs—material, psychological, or 
otherwise (Jones et al. 1977; Thomas 1982).
A number of perspectives suggest that citizens might find contacting a 
copartisan legislator relatively more appealing. First, a rich tradition in the 
psychological study of intergroup relations documents that people tend to 
prefer interpersonal contact with fellow group members and avoid contact 
with outgroups. For example, many whites tend to avoid interpersonal 
interactions with blacks and prefer interacting with other whites (e.g., Allport
1954; Blascovich et al. 2001). Moreover, when individuals are forced to 
interact with outgroup members, they often become anxious (e.g., Plant and 
Devine 2003), grow weary (e.g., Richeson and Trawalter 2005) and develop 
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feelings of resentment or hostility (e.g., Enos 2014a; Enos 2014b). In light of 
research that citizen partisanship sometimes mimics the properties of social 
identities like race and gender (Green et al. 2002; Mason 2014; Iyenger and 
Westwood 2014; Theodoridis 2012), we expected partisans in the public 
might similarly prefer contact with elites in a partisan ingroup relative to a 
partisan outgroup. Consistent with this view, work on descriptive 
representation suggests that shared personal traits between politicians and 
constituents facilitate trust and communication (e.g., Broockman 2014; Gay 
2002; Mansbridge 1999). Likewise, partisans seem to prefer encountering 
information consistent with their partisan proclivities (Ryan and Brader 2013;
Stroud 2011; Taber and Lodge 2006).
Second, a blossoming literature in political science documents how 
citizens seem to show a preference for contact with copartisans in their day-
to-day lives. People seem to prefer living in places populated by copartisans 
(Cho et al. 2013; Hui 2013; Public Policy Polling 2012; but see Nall and 
Mummolo 2014) and prefer copartisans as mates (Alford et al. 2011; Huber 
and Malhotra 2012; Klofstad et al. 2012). We similarly expected that, when it
comes to the consequential decision of whether to contact their 
representatives, citizens may exhibit a similar preference for interacting with
copartisans.
Finally, we conjectured that citizens might expect copartisans to be 
more responsive to their concerns. When a citizen is in an elite’s winning 
coalition, she may expect that elite to work harder to maintain her support 
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than an elite who is able to win office without her support. Consistent with 
this view, experiments have found that elites are more responsive to 
communications from copartisans (Butler and Broockman 2011; Grose 2015).
Citizens may also tend to associate some negative traits with outpartisans, 
such as stubbornness or incompetence, that might lead them to expect 
contacting outpartisan legislators to be relatively less worthwhile.
The extent to which these expectations would apply to citizens 
contacting their representatives is unclear a priori. Contacting a 
representative is typically one-way or impersonal (e.g., email, postal mail) 
and so may not evoke the same aversion to outpartisans as face-to-face 
contact or dating decisions. Gay (2002) and Broockman (2014) find that 
citizens are more likely to communicate to legislators of their race, but 
partisan identity might not be as potent as racial identity. Moreover, citizens 
might engage tend to contact legislators mostly about matters of special 
importance, which could swamp partisan considerations. However, there are 
few studies of whether partisan identities influence everyday decisions of 
this sort (Iyenger and Westwood 2014).
Challenges in Identifying A Preference for Copartisan Contact
Comparing how likely citizens are to contact representatives of 
different parties seems a straightforward task but is fraught with inferential 
challenges. One tempting approach would be to compare the contact habits 
of (for instance) Democrats living in areas represented by a Democrat to the 
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contact habits of Democrats living in areas represented by a Republican, as 
would be possible with publically available datasets such as the American 
National Election Study or the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The
concern with this approach is endogeneity: significantly different contact 
rates could reflect a causal effect of a copartisan representative, but they 
could also reflect unrelated differences in district characteristics. This is not 
an idle concern. The possibility that Democrats most predisposed to 
participate in politics would sort themselves into the kind of areas likely to be
represented by Democrats has a ring of plausibility (e.g., Cho et al. 2013). 
Moreover, districts with the most active Democratic citizens might be more 
likely to elect Democratic representatives in the first place, leading 
Democratic legislators to tend to have more active Democratic constituents. 
Each of our studies thus attempts to isolate the relevant counterfactual—
would a citizen’s contact decisions have been different if an elected official 
were of a different party?—in its own way.
Study 1: An Explicit Preference for Copartisan Communication
We begin by examining whether citizens exhibit a preference for 
communicating to copartisan legislators when they have their choice of a 
copartisan and an outpartisan, both of whom hold the same office. To do so, 
we focus on the seventeen states that have one U.S. senator from each of 
the two major parties. In particular, we compare citizens’ self-reported 
preference for contacting their copartisan senator to the self-reported 
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preference for contacting their outpartisan senator and find that citizens 
consistently report greater interest in contacting their copartisan senator. 
Moreover, consistent with our theory, we find that the preference for 
contacting copartisans is larger when subjects have information about their 
senators’ party affiliations and persists whether or not ideological 
considerations are at stake.
Study 1’s approach has strengths and weaknesses. Our comparison 
between citizens’ contacting the copartisan rather than the outpartisan 
senator is not a perfect counterfactual—that could only come from changing 
the partisanship of the same politician—but it does hold constant attributes 
of citizens and the effects of political office. Moreover, the within-subjects 
design facilitates well-powered question-wording experiments to probe the 
resilience of these effects. Nevertheless, the self-reported and hypothetical 
nature of the dependent variable leaves Study 1 open to demand effects, a 
pitfall our other studies help address.
Data and methods
Study 1 draws from two distinct samples. First, we fielded a pilot study on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing service (N=150) (Berinsky
et al. 2012). Second, we repeated the study—and replicated the findings—on
a larger (N=330) sample collected by Survey Sampling International (SSI). 
Whereas MTurk is a convenience sample, SSI is a diverse national panel built
through targeted recruitment in various online communities that compares 
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favorably with Census benchmarks.3 The MTurk sample was fielded between 
December 28 to 30, 2013, and the SSI sample was fielded February 21 to 25,
2014.
After introductory questions collecting subjects’ demographic 
information and issue opinions (part of a separate investigation), subjects 
were asked about how they might express their political views about the 
Social Security program. In a baseline version of the question (experimental 
variations explained below), they were asked:
Several government programs pay benefits to many Americans. Social 
Security is one example of such a program, but there are others. 
Suppose you heard about a proposal the U.S. Senate was considering 
to make a change to Social Security that you did not like. How likely 
would you be to do each of the following?
There was then a grid with five activities, presented in a random order:
“Write a letter to the editor of a local newspaper”; “Voice your concerns 
through social media, such as Facebook or Twitter”; “Encourage your friends 
and neighbors to sign a petition”; “Contact Senator [Name], a Democrat”; 
and “Contact Senator [Name], a Republican,” where the names were 
programmed to be appropriate for the respondent’s state.4 The response 
3 Of course, the sample we report here is not reflective of the national population for the 
simple reason that our design leads us to focus on respondents in the seventeen states with 
one U.S. Senator from each party. We report sample demographics in our Supporting 
Information.
4 As is evident, the two items focused on contact the senators were our main interest. The 
other items were included for two reasons. First, we thought including only the items 
focused on senators would present too stark a comparison. Presenting, as we do, the key 
items as part of a menu of several actions makes the comparison between the copartisan 
and the outpartisan more subtle. Second, we conjectured that citizens who are represented 
by two outpartisans (a part of the sample not relevant to our hypothesis here, and thus not 
reported) would compensate by allocating their contact energies in other ways, but this 
conjecture was not supported. 
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options were Certain, Extremely likely, Very likely, Somewhat likely, and Not 
at all likely.
Our study also included two manipulations that provide robustness 
checks for our theory of partisan motivated communication. The first of 
these stemmed from our concern that partisan preference, if found to exist, 
might be driven by familiarity rather than psychological aversion. By virtue 
of being on party mail and canvassing lists, or by attending to one’s own 
party primary, a citizen might be more likely to recognize a copartisan’s 
name than the outpartisan’s. This familiarity could lead to a greater contact 
propensity for the copartisan, but would not be a preference per se. One 
implication of our account is that removing party labels should decrease the 
preference for contacting a copartisan senator, since partisan considerations 
may grow less salient, and since some subjects will not know which party 
each senator belongs to. To test whether this pattern holds, we randomly 
assigned whether senators’ party labels were included in the response items.
The second manipulation represents an effort to examine how far-
reaching a preference for contacting copartisans might be. One possibility is 
that citizens have a preference for contacting copartisans when there are 
ideological considerations in play, but are indifferent between copartisans 
and outpartisans otherwise. This pattern might emerge, for instance, if the 
copartisan preference arises from a perception (by citizens) that partisan 
rifts are insurmountable—that, when it comes to divisive issues with 
ideological overtones, critical feedback will receive little heed. Our theory, in 
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contrast, suggests that the preference for contacting copartisans might 
reach beyond hot-button policy issues. If this preference arises from an 
aversion to communicating with outpartisan legislators in general, it should 
emerge in ideological and non-ideological contexts alike.
As a test of whether the copartisan preference is contingent in this 
way, half the subjects in our sample saw a version of the question where we 
attempted to minimize ideological considerations. The question focused on 
constituent services (i.e. “casework”), a realm of activity that legislators like 
to emphasize precisely because it generally avoids implicating traditional 
partisan divisions (e.g., Serra and Cover 1992; Butler et al. 2012; Grimmer 
2013). Subjects were asked whether they would contact each senator not to 
express their opinions, but for help dealing with the bureaucracy. To 
maximize parallelism with the formulation above, we retained the mention of
Social Security. The alternative question read:
Several government programs pay benefits to many Americans. Social 
Security is one example of such a program, but there are others. 
Suppose there was an error and you did not receive a government 
benefit to which you were rightly entitled. How likely would you be to 
do each of the following.
The response items were unchanged in the Casework formulation, although 
the Casework formulation was fully crossed with the Party Label 
manipulation, making for a 2✕2 factorial design.
Results
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The main test statistic for Study 1 is the mean within-subject difference 
between self-reported likelihood of contacting the copartisan senator and 
self-reported likelihood of contacting the outpartisan senator. We code each 
senator as being a copartisan or an outpartisan with respect to the subject,5 
and then define Copartisan Preference as the subject’s preference for 
contacting the copartisan minus her preference for contacting the 
outpartisan (scaled to run -1 to 1). Thus, subjects who register a stronger 
preference for contacting their copartisan senator have positive values of 
Copartisan Preference. Negative values of Copartisan Preference reflect a 
preference for contacting an outpartisan senator. Values of zero on 
Copartisan Preference reflect indifference.
Table 1 and Figure 1 report Study 1’s main results. In the table, 
Copartisan Preference is regressed on an intercept (which allows 
examination of the bias as averaged across experimental conditions). There 
are also models that regress Copartisan Preference on indicators for each 
condition and their interaction.6 In the figure, the y-axis refers to the mean 
level of Copartisan Preference in each condition.
As can be seen, partisans in both samples tend to show a greater 
preference for contacting their copartisan senator, consistent with our 
hypothesis. To convey the basic result in more intuitive terms, we find (in 
5 Party identification had been previously measured on the same survey using the standard 
ANES question. Strong partisans, weak partisans, and leaners are all included in the main 
analyses below. Independents are not, since we cannot define either senator as a copartisan
or outpartisan.
6 The SSI sample is sufficiently diverse that we can generate probability weights to make the
sample more reflective of the national population. However, because the study is 
experimental in nature, here we present the unweighted results. Weighted results, which 
lead to the same conclusions, are available upon request.
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both samples) that more than 23% of respondents report a preference for 
contacting a copartisan. Less than 7% report a preference for contacting the 
outpartisan.
Differences across experimental conditions are also consistent with our
hypothesis. First, consider the effect of removing party labels. In both 
samples, Copartisan Preference is stronger when party labels are present 
which, as we discuss above, is consistent with partisanship itself playing a 
role in generating copartisan preference. However, Copartisan Preference is 
also significantly positive (p<.02 in both samples) when party labels are 
absent, propitious for the generalizability of this effect. Next, the groups of 
columns in each panel show the effects separately for whether the scripts 
asked respondents to consider whether the issue at hand concerned a policy 
or constituency service matter. Here, we find no effect from manipulating 
whether the contact context concerns a bill versus casework, a result that 
suggests copartisan contacting preference spills over even into domains 
where policy concerns should fade into the background. We return to this 
result in the discussion.7
Figure 1. Experimental Results, Study 1
7 The unique representational environment in the US Senate also potentially foretells special 
significance for the effects we uncover in this study and the next. Evidence suggests that US
Senators feel special pressure to differentiate themselves from each other as they seek to 
form a unique reputation in the minds of a shared set of voters (Schiller 2000). Our results 
suggest that Senators representing the very same states might differ for yet another reason:
the different balance of communication they will receive from copartisans and outpartisans.
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Mean levels of Copartisan Preference, depending on experimental condition. 
Whiskers indicate standard errors.
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Table 1. Preference for Copartisan, by condition
MTurk Sample SSI Sample
Copartisan Preference 0.107*
*
(0.020)
0.154*
*
(0.034)
0.143*
*
(0.052)
0.081*
*
(0.014)
0.115*
*
(0.021
)
0.116*
*
(0.028)
(Intercept)
No Partisan Label -- -0.092* -0.096 -- -
0.069*
-0.070
-- (0.040) (0.058) -- (0.028) (0.039)
Casework -- -- 0.022 -- -- -0.001
-- -- (0.068) -- -- (0.042)
No Label ✕ -- -- 0.013 -- -- 0.002
Casework -- -- (0.081) -- -- (0.056)
Observations 150 150 150 330 330 330
** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05.
OLS models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The samples include 
partisans in the seventeen states represented by one Republican and one 
Democratic senator. Independents are excluded. The dependent variable is 
Copartisan Preference, so positive values equate to a preference for 
contacting copartisans.
Study 2: Field Experiments With A Liberal Interest Group
Study 1 presented subjects with a choice in which they directly 
consider their own likelihood of contacting a copartisan and an outpartisan 
senator. The virtue of this approach is that, because both senators hold the 
same office, it allows the influence of copartisanship to emerge clearly. The 
design, however, also had some weaknesses. Subjects were aware of 
participating in research, so their responses might be colored by demand 
characteristics, such as the desire to affirm their partisan leanings (Bullock et
16
al. 2013). The dilemma our subjects faced was also somewhat artificial, 
leaving open the possibility that citizens distinguish between copartisans and
outpartisans when the two are starkly presented side-by-side, but not in 
more typical circumstances, such as when prompted by an interest group. 
Finally, it queried subjects’ hypothetical intentions, which might or might not 
reflect how they actually would behave.
Our next study considers two field experiments conducted by an 
advocacy group, data that complement the evidence from Study 1 in two 
important ways. First, whereas Study 1 relied on responses within an 
academic survey, the field experiments are more naturalistic: they allow us 
to observe citizens responding to real-world political stimuli instead of a 
survey instrument. Second, Study 2 employs a between-subjects design, 
reducing concern the results reflect demand effects. Finally, the field 
experiments examine real behaviors instead of self-reported intentions on 
surveys.
Data and methods
The experiments took place through two organizing campaigns 
conducted by a liberal interest group. The group maintains a list of several 
million Americans who have opted in to receive notices about opportunities 
for political activism. Both campaigns concerned Senator Feinstein’s FISA 
Improvements Act, Senate Bill 1631 in the 113th Senate. Senator Feinstein 
drafted the bill in response to the revelations of Edward Snowden about the 
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National Security Agency’s surveillance programs. The bill proposed some 
regulation and oversight of the NSA but also would establish the legality of 
many of the programs Edward Snowden’s summer 2013 disclosures brought 
to light. The group that conducted the experiment opposed the bill because 
it would codify many of these NSA programs, to which it objected.
The group sent emails to its members asking them to contact their 
senators and request that they oppose the bill. As part of internal studies of 
how to increase the effectiveness of their outreach efforts, the group 
randomly assigned which of each recipient’s two senators he or she was 
asked to contact. Therefore, in the seventeen states with senators of two 
parties, half the message recipients were asked to contact their Republican 
senator, and half were asked to contact their Democratic senator. The group 
conducted two such studies: one focused on generating signatures on 
petitions addressed to Senators and the other focused on generating phone 
calls to their offices.
Because the group in question is very liberal in its orientation, and 
because its mailing list is opt-in on the basis of performing liberal activism 
with the group, it is safe to assume that the proportion of message recipients
who see themselves as Democrats vastly exceeds the proportion who see 
themselves as Republicans.8 Therefore, if the outpartisan communication 
aversion hypothesis holds true, recipients should be more likely to engage in 
8 Indeed, the group has supported numerous election campaigns seeking to defeat 
Republican Members of Congress.
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activism when the message asks them to contact their Democratic senator 
than when it asks them to contact the Republican.
Petition Experiment
In the first experiment, the group asked members to sign an online 
petition. There were 117,984 message recipients in the seventeen split-
delegation states, and 13,253 of them signed the petition (11.2%). In Table 
2, we regress (OLS) the binary Signed indicator on the treatment indicator 
for the copartisan condition.9 The top-left coefficient means that the signing 
rate was 0.7 percentage points higher in the copartisan condition, a 
significant difference. The dataset provided to us also includes a small 
number of covariates, and including them in the model likely sharpens our 
estimate of the treatment effect, so we present the results accounting for 
this information as well.10 As can be seen, this inclusion does not change 
inferences.
Phone Call Experiment
Signing a petition is an easy task that takes just a few moments. Does 
the preference for contacting copartisans also apply to more effortful 
actions? There is evidence that it does. The interest group followed up its 
9 Our outcome is binary, but we present OLS results, rather than logit or probit, because it is 
easier to interpret and still leads to consistent inferences (e.g., Freedman 2008). The results 
are nevertheless robust to using logit and probit models instead and attain the same level of
statistical significance with these models.
10 The covariates are the number of days the message recipient has been on the mailing list,
and the (logged) number of previous activities she had completed. Both of these variables 
are highly significant. We also have information on subjects’ zip code, which we enter as 
fixed effects. (Results available upon request.)
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initial solicitation with a second email asking its members to call one of their 
senators’ offices about opposing the bill. Calling merits separate attention 
because it requires a more substantial time investment and, for this reason, 
might influence legislators more powerfully (e.g., Kollman 1998; Bergan 
2009; Congressional Management Foundation 2011).
As in the Petition Experiment, in the Phone Call Experiment the group 
contacted its members via email and randomized which senator members 
were urged to contact.11 Message recipients expressed a desire to call the 
senator they were assigned by clicking a link in this email reading “Call 
Senator [SENATOR]…Click here for the sample script and the number to 
call.” (The full text of the email is shown in the Supporting Information.) 
When clicked, this link took group members to a web page containing the 
phone number for the senator’s office and sample arguments opposing the 
policy they could deliver. The outcome variable we analyze is whether 
recipients sought to engage in this form of contact by clicking the link in 
order to get information on how to call their senator’s office.12
Not surprisingly, fewer subjects overall sought to engage in this more 
effortful form of contact relative to petitions—just 3.13% of those prompted. 
However, as Table 2 reports, subjects were significantly more likely to do so 
when asked to call their copartisan senator. Again, this effect is robust to the
inclusion of controls.
11 The sample sizes for the experiments differ for reasons unrelated to the experiment itself: 
because the Phone Call experiment occurred in close proximity to other mobilization efforts 
by the organization and it attempts to limit the number of emails its members receive.
12 Because the activist organization does not have access to the phone records of its 
members, it cannot directly measure calls actually placed.
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In percentage point terms, the effect we observe in the Phone Call 
experiment is slightly smaller than in the Petition Experiment, although the 
baseline is also much lower. Alternatively, when viewed as a percentage 
increase over the control, the effect is larger than in the Petition Experiment,
evidence that the copartisan preference might be more important for this 
more personal and interactive form of contact. Put differently, in the Phone 
Call Experiment it appears that about 1 in 7 group members who sought to 
contact their copartisan senator would not have done so had the group 
asked them to contact their outpartisan senator instead. In the Petition 
Experiment this same figure is about 1 in 15.13
13 As we elaborate in the general discussion, we think this difference could arise for at least 
three reasons: because phone calls are a more effortful form of contact, because they 
represent a more personal interaction than signing a petition, or because the effects are 
greatest among those willing to make calls in the first place. We would welcome more 
research on the merits of these possibilities.
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Table 2. Results from Two Field Experiments
Petition
Experiment
Phone Call Experiment
Signed Signed Sought to
Call
Sought to
Call
Copartisa
n
0.007** 0.005*
*
0.004** 0.003**
Senator (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.109** - 0.030** -
(0.001) (0.001)
Observati
ons
117,98
4
116,59
9
64,996 63,672
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed tests.
Notes: OLS models, standard errors in parentheses.
Together with our earlier results, Study 2 increases our confidence that
American citizens’ stated preference for contact with copartisan 
representatives translates into their actual participation decisions. However, 
like all field experiments, Study 2 has important limitations. The results are 
limited to one group, one population, and one issue. In our view, the most 
important question is whether the same dynamics would persist when 
citizens decide whether to contact their legislators organically, and not at the
prompting of an interest group. Study 3 attempts to expand the external 
validity of Studies 1 and 2 in considering this question.
Study 3: A Regression Discontinuity Design in the US House
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Our studies so far consider how citizens react when an interest group 
or survey researchers present them with the opportunity to contact their 
representatives. However, this approach may not fully capture significance 
of copartisan preference when citizens choose to contact legislators of their 
own accord. For example, if citizens find a political issue particularly 
distressing, they may not be much encouraged or deterred by their 
representative’s party. On the other hand, subjects in the field experiment 
may also have felt compelled to contact their representative at the interest 
group’s insistence, pressure that could overwhelm many citizens’ preference
for contact with copartisans. Our studies so far have also been limited to the 
US Senate, leaving open the question of whether the same patterns would be
present in other institutional contexts.
Study 3 helps address these questions by approaching the copartisan 
preference from an entirely different angle. We take advantage of the 2008 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a large (N=32,800) 
dataset collected online by YouGov/Polimetrix in October and November of 
2008.14 Convenient for our purposes, the 2008 CCES asked each respondent 
whether he or she has contacted his or her current representative in the U.S.
House of Representatives.15 Because the CCES also collects information on 
subjects’ partisanship, it is possible to compare (retrospective) contact of 
copartisans to contact of outpartisans.
14 See http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/home for details on the sampling methodology.
15 The question wording was, “Have you (or anyone in your family living here) ever 
contacted Representative [House member name] or anyone in [House member gender] 
office?” We code responses simply as Yes=1, No=0. Unfortunately, this question was not 
included on subsequent iterations of the CCES.
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So far, this approach leaves unaddressed the matters of endogeneity 
we emphasized earlier. Fortunately, the prodigious size of the CCES sample 
allows us to carry out a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis geared to 
address problems of endogeneity.16 Increasingly common in the study of 
political representation and behavior (e.g., Eggers and Hainmueller 2009), 
RD exploits quasi-random assignment of very close US House races to 
identify the causal effect of electing a legislator of a particular party under 
fairly weak conditions (Lee 2008). The intuition that underlines the technique
is that, while election outcomes are not generally random, the outcome of 
narrowly decided elections is “as good as” random, and thus can serve to 
identify causal effects of the outcome. Here, we examine whether Americans
living in Congressional districts where a copartisan narrowly won the last US 
House election are more likely to report having contacted their US House 
member than Americans living in Congressional districts where the 
copartisan narrowly lost. The assumptions needed to recover unbiased 
effects are even weaker in our studies than in other applications of RDs, as 
analyze variation across partisan groups within districts.
To preview our results, we find that copartisans tend to contact their 
representatives more when copartisan candidates narrowly won the last 
election than when copartisan narrowly lost. That is, for example, 
Democratic citizens in districts where Democratic Members of Congress 
16 A large sample is important because, as one focuses on the subset of cases where the 
outcome of an election can be deemed “good as random,” the useable sample shrinks 
substantially. Unfortunately, the sampling techniques used by the ANES make it difficult or 
impossible to conduct an RD analysis.
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narrowly won the last election tend to report having contacted their 
Members of Congress more often than do Democratic citizens in districts 
where Republican Members of Congress were barely elected. These results 
are robust to a variety of different modeling approaches.
Data and methods
As described above, our data come from the 2008 CCES. To this dataset, we 
append information on the outcome of the 2006 House elections gathered 
from the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection. We also manually 
incorporated information on a small number of special elections that 
occurred mid-congressional term. We treated the most recent election in a 
given district as the election of record. Based on respondents’ reported 
partisanship (leaners included), we code each as being represented by a 
copartisan or outpartisan House member.
As we note above, a number of studies find narrowly determined 
House elections—including some of the same elections we analyze here—to 
satisfy the requirements for an RD design. Still, because we are using a 
subset of the previously used data (i.e., results from a single, rather than 
multiple, election cycles), we examine a number of covariates that might 
relate to political engagement to determine whether they are balanced in 
they way that allows us to recover the effect of being represented by a co-
partisan, rather than an outpartisan, House member.17 As reported in the 
17 Independents are removed from the sample as they are ineligible for being represented by
copartisans or outpartisans. Including independents does not alter the results.
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Supplementary Information, when we examine respondents in districts where
congressional races were determined by one percentage point or less, we 
find only small and insignificant relationships with performance on a political 
knowledge battery, frequency of church attendance, self-reported attention 
to politics, and respondents’ income. Like previous studies using some of the
same data (e.g. Caughey and Sekhon 2011), however, we do not find perfect
balance on every covariate. As the Supplementary Information reports, there
are moderate relationships with average strength of Democratic Party 
identification and proclivity to make political donations. For both of these 
measures, though, the imbalances are in a direction that make our 
hypothesis tests more conservative: having a copartisan representative 
corresponds to weaker partisan identification and fewer political donations. 
We expect that these relationships would cause us, if anything, to understate
the effect of having a copartisan representative on contact, as people whose 
copartisans narrowly won the last election tend to be slightly less politically 
engaged in other ways. There is a positive relationship with strength of 
Republican identification, though it is modest in size and, by a difference of 
means test, not statistically significant. Still, as a robustness check, we 
supplement the results of our RD analysis with a flexible matching approach 
that accounts for remaining imbalances.18
 
18 In the Supplementary Information, we also examine how our results differ as the RD 
window grows larger. The estimated ATE is very stable, and the results generally remain at 
the same level of statistical significance.
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Results
First, we inspect the potential discontinuity in contact behavior visually. 
Using kernel-smoothed polynomial regression, we fit lines that illustrate how 
citizens’ contact behavior depends on their own party’s margin of victory 
(Figure 2).19 We fit separate lines on either side of the potential discontinuity.
As the figure shows, there is a marked increase in the likelihood of a citizen 
saying she contacted her congressional representative when the citizen’s 
own party narrowly won the 2006 election.20
Figure 2. Effect of a Copartisan Representative
19 We use a triangle kernel and set the bandwidth at .074, which is the MSE-optimal 
bandwidth for our analysis, as calculated from the method in Calonico et al. (2014a; 2014b). 
Confidence intervals are constructed by estimating the conditional variance at each point 
along the regression line using the standard Silverman (1986, 48) estimator.
20 The main result in Figure 2 is the sharp increase in contact behavior at the point of the 
discontinuity (the center of the figure). Some might be interested in a separate pattern: the 
substantial increase in contact probability as outcomes, both wins or losses, become more 
lopsided. We think this trend might be explained by district characteristics that correlate 
with having lopsided election outcomes: such districts are more likely to be represented by 
entrenched, long-serving incumbents who have had ample time to develop relationships and
name recognition with constituents, which could lower barriers to citizen contact. It is worth 
noting that a comparable increase by both lines means that the difference between them is 
roughly constant. (To see this, visualize folding the figure along its vertical midpoint.) Of 
course, the RD assumptions required to give this difference a causal interpretation become 
less plausible as districts become more lopsided. Nevertheless, in the Supplementary 
Information, we show that the difference in contact likelihood is quite constant, and has 
comparable levels of statistical significance, for regression discontinuity windows between 1 
and 20 percentage points (§3.2).
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Margin of victory regression discontinuity, as estimated by local polynomial 
regression (triangle kernel) with MSE-optimal bandwidth. Shaded areas 
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
For our main statistical analysis, we regress (OLS) self-reported contact
on an indicator variable for having a copartisan representative within the one
percentage point RD window described above. Because our independent 
variable of interest varies at the district level, we cluster standard errors by 
district. In Table 3, we present two models: one that includes a fixed effect 
for each district in the sample, and one that does not. As can be seen, 
citizens are more likely to contact their representative if a copartisan 
narrowly won, than if a copartisan narrowly lost—a difference that 
statistically significant and of a substantively consequential size.21
Table 3. Results from CCES Regression Discontinuity Study
DV = Contacted US House Member
(1) (2) (3)
Copartisan     0.078*          0.072*         0.079*
21 Given the small number of clusters (districts) in this analysis, we also compute 
bootstrapped and jackknifed standard errors, with districts are the sampling unit. For both 
tests, the standard errors are almost identical.
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ATE
SE (0.027) (0.032) (0.033)
Method OLS, no
Fixed Effects
OLS w/
Fixed Effects
Genetic 
Matching
N 1,290 1,290 1,290
# Districts 15 15 15
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Columns (1) and (2) estimate the effect of a copartisan representative by 
OLS, within a one percentage point regression discontinuity window. District-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. Column (3) estimates the 
Copartisan ATE by genetic matching within a one percentage point 
discontinuity window.
For the reasons noted above, we also supplement our RD analysis with 
a matching analysis that potentially sharpens estimates of treatment effects 
by comparing observations with similar values on observable characteristics.
We use GenMatch (Sekhon 2011), an approach that employs a genetic 
search algorithm to assign weights to observations so as to maximize 
covariate balance.22 To increase the plausibility of the assumption that the 
treatment variable is independent of subjects’ potential outcomes 
conditioned on observables, we conduct our matching analysis within a one 
percentage point discontinuity window. GenMatch allows us to achieve 
strong covariate balance (SI, Section 2.1). As reported in Table 2, this 
estimate of the copartisan ATE corroborates the results from our RD 
analysis.23
22 Variables used for matching were those expected to be prognostic of contacting one’s 
legislator: political knowledge, church attendance, Democratic Party ID strength, Republican 
Party ID strength, age, political activity, interest in politics, and income. Because district 
fixed effects are included in the models, observable and unobservable attributes of 
legislators themselves are controlled for, including status as a freshman, tenure in the 
house, and representational style.
23 For the matching analysis, standard errors are those proposed by Abadie and Imbens 
(2006) and calculated by the Matching package for R.
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Across all the analyses we employ, the results are strikingly stable. 
Victory by a copartisan representative appears to increase self-reported 
contacting of representatives, a result that is significant both statistically and
substantively. We take these results as further evidence in favor of partisan 
motivated communication.
We motivated our discussion of Study 3 by noting that how citizens 
behave when deciding to spontaneously contact their representatives may 
differ from how they behave when others prompt them to do so, as in 
Studies 1 and 2. By contrast, Study 3 asks subjects to report their previous 
contacting behavior across circumstances, which includes both their own 
decisions to contact their representatives as well as the mobilized variety of 
contact we considered in the previous studies.
The results suggest that the total magnitude of copartisan preference 
across these circumstances is quite sizable. For example, the genetic 
matching method suggests that the causal effect of being represented by a 
copartisan on contact is 7.9 percentage points from a baseline of about 31%.
This suggests that being represented by a copartisan lead citizens to contact
their representatives about 27% more often, the implications of which we 
expand on in the discussion.
There is one more important takeaway from Study 3. Study 1 leaves 
open the possibility that copartisan preference does not decrease citizen 
contact of politicians, but rather displaces it from an outpartisan to a 
copartisan. Study 2 does not go far in addressing this possibility because it 
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focuses on responses to a mobilization campaign. By focusing on members 
of the House of Representatives, Study 3 gives the strongest evidence that 
the preference for contacting a copartisan representative silences voices 
that might otherwise be heard.
 
Discussion: Preaching To The Choir
Many scholars have worried that partisan attachments serve to 
insulate citizens from encountering meaningful disagreement with their 
political views (e.g. Haidt 2012; Mutz 2006; Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller 
1992). Here, we present evidence that such motivations bear not only on the
information citizens receive from elites; they also work in the other direction,
isolating elites from hearing the perspectives of the citizens most likely to 
disagree with them. Drawing evidence from a variety of data, and a mixture 
of observational and experimental research designs, we found a reliable 
copartisan preference in communication that manifested in real world 
participation decisions.
Although not dispositive about the size of this effect in all 
circumstances, our evidence suggests it can be substantively significant. In 
Study 1, over 25% of respondents reported a preference for contacting a 
copartisan. In the Phone Call field experiment, 13% of group members who 
sought to contact a copartisan senator would not have done so had the 
senator been an outpartisan instead. On the other hand, the effect size we 
found in our petition experiment was somewhat smaller. But in Study 3—
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arguably the most helpful for contemplating broader effects—the effect is 
quite large: a 27 percent increase.24 As we elaborate below, this variation is 
fruitful topic for future research. Nevertheless, we see consistent evidence 
that, under a variety of circumstances, it can be quite sizable. 
Given how closely elected officials appear to watch the communication
they receive from constituents (e.g., Bergan 2009; Congressional 
Management Foundation 2011; Miler 2010), these findings have important 
implications for understanding the mindset of elites. As an illustration of one 
such possibility, consider a simple analysis from the CCES. For Members of 
Congress who “just won” the 2006 election, 25 50% of the citizens who 
reported contacting them were copartisans, compared to only 40% who were
from the other party. (The remaining 10% do not state a party identification.)
Such a disparity suggests that even legislators making their best effort to 
represent their constituencies faithfully may place too much weight on the 
views and priorities of their copartisans. Such implications need not be 
limited to citizens’ policy preferences per se: given evidence that partisan 
citizens often seem hostile to elite compromises (Harbridge and Malhotra 
2011; Ryan 2013) this bias might also discourage elite cooperation.26
Our results also raise an intriguing possibility about the sources of 
rising partisan polarization. A number of studies show that politicians of 
24 Note that this paragraph discusses all effects within percentage terms, not percentage 
point terms. Percentage point differences can be found in our discussion of each Study’s 
results earlier in the paper.
25 Within 1 percentage point. Results are similar with other windows.
26 Consistent with this possibility, Broockman and Skovron (2014) find that two candidates 
running to represent the same district tend to overestimate the degree to which the same 
voters agree with (divergent) positions.
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different parties tend to represent and perceive the very same constituents 
quite differently (Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Broockman and Skovron 2014; 
Fiorina and Abrams 2009; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009). This is 
crucial, for it means that some differences between how Democratic and 
Republican elites behave do not arise solely from differences in the citizens 
they represent. Recognizing this, some scholars have turned to institutional 
factors, such as enhanced tools to enforce party discipline, to explain this 
representational disconnect (e.g., Theriault 2008). We do not take issue with 
findings that stress the role of elites, but we note that our results point to a 
potentially prominent role for citizens in contributing to differences in elite 
behavior.
The patterns we identify also bear on a number of broader questions. 
First, although not dispositive, our results are consistent with other research 
that finds partisanship can behave like a social identity, “spilling over” into 
behaviors other than vote choice (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyenger and 
Westwood 2014; Klofstad et al. 2012; Mason 2014). The behavioral patterns 
we found do not seem to represent mere cheap talk on surveys (e.g., Bullock
2013), but are consistent with the view that partisanship can affect ancillary 
behavior (e.g., Gerber and Huber 2009; Gift and Gift 2014). To be sure, our 
results cannot definitively establish what aspect of partisanship leads 
Americans to prefer contacting copartisans. For instance, we cannot 
distinguish whether people assume that the outpartisan will not respond to 
their requests or instead attempt to avoid negative feelings that come from 
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communicating with an outgroup. However, our results further underline that
partisanship’s influence is far-reaching.
In addition, the preference for contacting copartisans we find bears on 
the strategies that interest groups will find attractive as they seek to 
mobilize supporters. Political outcomes frequently turn on interest groups’ 
ability to manage the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960), and 
observers often welcome the idea of a more energetic and participatory 
electorate (e.g., Verba et al. 2012). As Study 2 illustrated most vividly, our 
results suggest that interest groups seeking to drum up the maximum 
volume of correspondence directed at an elected official might see benefits 
in urging citizens to contact copartisans. As such, our results resonate with 
other findings that suggest some strategies which make the electorate more 
participatory can also exacerbate political ills (e.g., Enos et al. 2014). Making
partisan considerations focal in grassroots campaigns might be an effective 
way to increase citizens’ involvement, but it might also serve to further 
distort legislators’ perceptions of their constituencies. Indeed, in Study 1, we 
found that reminding citizens of their Senators’ partisan affiliations made 
them less interested in contacting outpartisan Senators relative to 
copartisans.
Our results also point to a number of possible extensions. First, even 
when citizens are contacting a copartisan, their messages can be supportive 
(“Keep up the good work”), critical (“You are out of line”), or merely directive
(“I want you to support this bill”). Studies 1 and 2 above fit most comfortably
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in the directive category, while Study 3 lumps all types of contact together. 
This combination of approaches requires us to be measured in how much we 
can conclude about the extent to which the bias we identify causes elites to 
entrench in their current issue positions versus prognosticate what partisan 
voters will want. Future work could more systematically examine the content
of citizens’ contact efforts. 
Second, one could imagine the extent of the copartisan bias depending
on institutional factors. For instance, the preference for contacting 
copartisans might be attenuated for state-level offices, where partisan 
considerations and rhetoric is sometimes subdued. For another possibility, 
representatives from single-member districts (e.g. the House) might seek to 
downplay partisanship relative to dual-member districts (e.g. the Senate), 
since senators are eager to differentiate themselves from each other 
(Schiller 2000).
Third, our theoretical focus on social identity leads us to think that the 
extent of bias might depend on the mode of contact. In particular, it is 
possible citizens exhibit a greater copartisan preference when it comes to 
especially intense or personal forms of contact, such as speaking to a 
representative at an event, the very kinds of interactions that research 
suggests weigh most heavily in legislators’ minds (Congressional 
Management Foundation 2011). Consistent with this potential, the 
differences we uncover in Study 2 are larger (in percentage terms) when it 
comes to phone calls—a relatively personal and effortful form of contact—
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than for signing a petition. We cannot conclusively establish a relationship 
between the preference for copartisan contact and how personal this contact
is with our data, however, and we would welcome more on the matter.
Despite our general leeriness of a tendency for politicians to live in 
bubbles, isolated from the views of citizens they are supposed to represent, 
we can close on a cautiously optimistic note. Across many settings, one of 
the best ways to address biases in behavior and decision-making is to make 
individuals aware of the biases in their behavior (e.g., Monteith 1993). For 
example, sports referees who exhibited racial bias when allocating points 
and fouls adjusted their behavior once made aware of it (Pope et al. 2014). 
Likewise, making politicians aware that the balance of communication they 
receive from constituents is skewed by partisanship might help reduce their 
misperceptions of their constituents’ views and encourage moderation, to 
the extent politicians wish to do so (Butler and Nickerson 2011).27 Citizens 
could benefit from a reminder, too. Divisions are deep; political animosities 
are rife. But the folks on the other side just might listen.
27 Other work suggests that the most effective solution would not be to correct 
representatives’ understanding of the base rate, but rather to highlight exemplars of citizens
who do not share their partisanship (Zillmann 1999).
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